Nigeria’s Third Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0), officially submitted in September 2025, represents the country’s most ambitious climate commitment to date. It is designed as a blueprint for aligning Nigeria’s development pathway with global climate goals, while integrating subnational perspectives and national development priorities.
The plan covers sector-wide strategies for emissions reduction and adaptation, with clear targets, inclusive processes, and a bold financing vision. Yet, the challenge remains whether Nigeria can turn this blueprint into lived reality.

NDC 3.0 commits Nigeria to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 29% by 2030 and 32% by 2035 relative to 2018 levels. This translates to an emissions reduction of about 184.9 million tonnes CO₂e from a 2018 baseline of 573.5 million tonnes. The plan maintains an unconditional 20% emissions reduction target by 2030, with conditional reductions (dependent on international finance and support) covering roughly 80% of the 29% (2030) and 32% (2035) targets.
Importantly, these commitments are aligned with Nigeria’s net-zero target by 2060. On energy access and transition, the NDC sets a target of achieving 100% electricity access by 2030 and ensuring that at least 50% of power generation comes from renewables by the same year. It also envisions phasing out kerosene lighting by 2035 and shifting household cooking fuels from biomass to LPG and electricity.
The NDC covers all major emitting sectors: energy (including oil and gas), transportation, industry, agriculture, forestry, and waste. Priority actions include achieving a 60% reduction in fugitive emissions (leaks and venting) from the oil and gas sector, accelerating adoption of electric and compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles, expanding both on-grid and off-grid renewable energy, cutting deforestation while promoting sustainable forestry and ecosystem restoration, and advancing climate-smart agriculture to build resilience for farmers already facing droughts, floods, and soil degradation. These goals signal a push to decarbonise while also addressing food security, livelihoods, and resilience.
A defining feature of NDC 3.0 is its emphasis on subnational engagement. States, local governments, and communities were consulted in its design, and the framework envisions governors, state ministries, and local actors as key implementers. This reflects a growing recognition that climate action and resilience-building happen most directly at subnational levels, where floods, droughts, and insecurity impact lives daily.
Nigeria estimates that implementing NDC 3.0 will require $337 billion between now and the mid-2030s – $195 billion for mitigation and $141.5 billion for adaptation. The latter includes infrastructure resilience, food security, and loss and damage measures. The document assumes that concessional international finance, blended instruments to crowd in private capital, and stronger domestic institutions will make this scale of financing possible. Yet, experience suggests that securing and deploying such funds remains a daunting challenge. Domestic budgets cannot cover the gap, and donor flows are becoming more uncertain.
Multilateral funds exist but remain highly competitive, and Nigeria’s past struggles with transparency and project readiness continue to deter large-scale access. The National Climate Change Fund offers a potential domestic mechanism, but it is undercapitalised. Without bankable projects, robust monitoring and reporting, and guarantees against political and security risks, private capital is unlikely to flow at the necessary scale.
Beyond finance, security may be the single biggest factor undermining NDC delivery. Banditry, insurgency, oil theft, and communal clashes directly affect climate projects – delaying renewable rollouts, displacing farmers, and deterring investment. Unless security is treated as part of climate infrastructure, project implementation will remain fragile.
At the same time, Nigeria’s extractive dependence continues to cast a long shadow. While oil and gas are framed as “transition fuels,” the lure of revenues from new fossil projects, alongside a rising boom in solid minerals such as gold and lithium, risks locking Nigeria into another extractive cycle.
Without strong governance and environmental safeguards, these sectors could undermine climate goals. Politically, the landscape remains volatile. Elections are approaching, campaigns are already absorbing policymaker attention, and fossil fuel lobbies remain influential. Climate goals risk being subordinated to short-term bargains. Without insulation from electoral cycles, sustaining the long-term planning required for NDC delivery will be difficult.
In an optimistic scenario, Nigeria could mobilise blended finance, improve security in key corridors, accelerate distributed renewables, and scale up climate-smart agriculture. This would not deliver every headline target, but it could produce significant progress by 2030. More likely is a mixed scenario: pockets of success in states with strong leadership or donor support, but limited national-scale impact. The pessimistic scenario – shrinking finance, worsening insecurity, and unchecked extractives – remains equally plausible.
Can Nigeria achieve its net-zero target by 2060? The answer depends on how the next decade is navigated. If NDC 3.0 drives genuine structural change; mobilising finance, mainstreaming renewables, transforming agriculture, regulating extractives, and integrating security into climate planning, then the 2060 goal remains possible. However, if the implementation gaps that plague previous commitments persist, net-zero will remain aspirational.
The stakes are enormous: resilience for millions of citizens, credibility on the global stage, and the ability to prove that African nations can lead in defining just, inclusive climate pathways. If finance is mobilised, security integrated, extractives governed, and politics stabilised, NDC 3.0 could mark a turning point. If not, it risks joining the list of climate plans that read well on paper but fail in practice.
By Donald Ikenna Ofoegbu, Programme Manager, Sustainable Nigeria Programme, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Abuja
